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Efficient One-Way Secret-Key Agreement and Private Channel Coding via
Polarization
David Sutter,∗ Joseph M. Renes,† and Renato Renner‡
Institute for Theoretical Physics, ETH Zurich, Switzerland
We introduce explicit schemes based on the polarization phenomenon for the tasks of one-
way secret key agreement from common randomness and private channel coding. For the
former task, we show how to use common randomness and insecure one-way communication
to obtain a strongly secure key such that the key construction has a complexity essentially
linear in the blocklength and the rate at which the key is produced is optimal, i.e., equal to
the one-way secret-key rate. For the latter task, we present a private channel coding scheme
that achieves the secrecy capacity using the condition of strong secrecy and whose encoding
and decoding complexity are again essentially linear in the blocklength.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider two parties, Alice and Bob, connected by an authentic but otherwise fully insecure
communication channel. It has been shown that without having access to additional resources, it
is impossible for them to carry out information-theoretically secure private communication [1, 2].
In particular they are unable to generate an unconditionally secure key with which to encrypt mes-
sages transmitted over the insecure channel. However, if Alice and Bob have access to correlated
randomness about which an adversary (Eve) has only partial knowledge, the situation changes com-
pletely: information-theoretically secure secret-key agreement and private communication become
possible. Alternatively, if Alice and Bob are connected by a noisy discrete memoryless channel
(DMC) to which Eve has only limited access—the so-called wiretap channel scenario of Wyner [3],
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [4], and Maurer [2]—private communication is again possible.
In this paper, we present explicit schemes for efficient one-way secret-key agreement from com-
mon randomness and for private channel coding in the wiretap channel scenario. Our schemes are
based on polar codes, a family of capacity-achieving linear codes, introduced by Arıkan [5], that can
be encoded and decoded efficiently. Previous work by us in a quantum setup [6] already implies
that practically efficient one-way secret-key agreement and private channel coding in a classical
setup is possible, where a practically efficient scheme is one whose computational complexity is
essentially linear in the blocklength. The aim of this paper is to explain the schemes in detail and
give a purely classical proof that the schemes are reliable, secure, practically efficient and achieve
optimal rates. Section II introduces the problems of performing one-way secret-key agreement and
private channel coding. We summarize known and new results about the optimal rates for these two
problems for different wiretap channel scenarios. In Section III, we explain how to obtain one-way
secret-key agreement that is practically efficient, strongly secure, reliable, and achieves the one-
way secret-key rate. However, we are not able to give an efficient algorithm for code construction.
Section IV introduces a similar scheme that can be used for strongly secure private channel coding
at the secrecy capacity. Finally in Section V, we state two open problems that are of interest in
the setup of this paper as well as in the quantum mechanical scenario introduced in [6].
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2II. BACKGROUND AND CONTRIBUTIONS
A. Notation and Definitions
Let [k] = {1, . . . , k} for k ∈ Z+. For x ∈ Zk2 and I ⊆ [k] we have x[I] = [xi : i ∈ I],
xi = [x1, . . . , xi] and x
i
j = [xj , . . . , xi] for j < i. The set Ac denotes the complement of the
set A. The uniform distribution on an arbitrary random variable X is denoted by PX . For
distributions P and Q over the same alphabet X , the variational distance is defined by δ(P,Q) :=
1
2
∑
x∈X |P (x)−Q(x)|. The notation X−◦−Y −◦−Z means that the random variables X,Y,Z form
a Markov chain in the given order.
In this setup we consider a discrete memoryless wiretap channel (DM-WTC) W : X → Y ×Z,
which is characterized by its transition probability distribution PY,Z|X . We assume that the variable
X belongs to Alice, Y to Bob and Z to Eve.
According to Ko¨rner and Marton [7], a DM-WTC W : X → Y × Z is termed more capable
if I(X;Y ) ≥ I(X;Z) for every possible distribution on X. The channel W is termed less noisy
if I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z) for every possible distribution on (U,X) where U has finite support and
U−◦−X−◦−(Y,Z) form a Markov chain. If X−◦−Y −◦−Z form a Markov chain, W is called degraded.
It has been shown [7] that being more capable is a strictly weaker condition than being less noisy,
which is a strictly weaker condition than being degraded. Hence, having a DM-WTC W which is
degraded implies that W is less noisy, which again implies that W is also more capable.
B. Polarization Phenomenon
Let XN be a vector whose entries are i.i.d. Bernoulli(p) distributed for p ∈ [0, 1] and N = 2n
where n ∈ Z+. Then define UN = GNXN , where GN denotes the polarization (or polar) transform
which can be represented by the matrix
GN :=
(
1 1
0 1
)⊗ logN
, (1)
where A⊗k denotes the kth Kronecker power of an arbitrary matrix A. Furthermore, let Y N =
W
NXN , where WN denotes N independent uses of a DMC W : X → Y. For ǫ ∈ (0, 1) we may
define the two sets
RNǫ (X|Y ) :=
{
i ∈ [N ] : H(Ui∣∣U i−1, Y N ) ≥ 1− ǫ} and (2)
DNǫ (X|Y ) :=
{
i ∈ [N ] : H(Ui∣∣U i−1, Y N ) ≤ ǫ} . (3)
The former consists of outputs Uj which are essentially uniformly random, even given all previous
outputs U j−1 as well as Y N , while the latter set consists of the essentially deterministic outputs.
The polarization phenomenon is that essentially all outputs are in one of these two subsets, and
their sizes are given by the conditional entropy of the input X given Y .
Theorem 1 (Polarization Phenomenon [5, 8]). For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1)∣∣RNǫ (X|Y )∣∣ = NH(X|Y )− o(N) and ∣∣DNǫ (X|Y )∣∣ = N (1−H(X|Y ))− o(N). (4)
Based on this theorem it is possible to construct a family of linear error correcting codes, called
polar codes, that have several desirable attributes [5, 9–11]: they provably achieve the capacity
of any DMC; they have an encoding and decoding complexity that is essentially linear in the
blocklength N ; the error probability decays exponentially in the square root of the blocklength.
3Correlated sequences of binary random variables may be polarized using a multilevel construc-
tion, as shown in [9].1 GivenM i.i.d. instances of a sequence X = (X(1),X(2), . . . X(K)) and possibly
a correlated random variable Y , the basic idea is to first polarize XM(1) relative to Y
M , then treat
XM(1)Y
M as side information in polarizing XM(2), and so on. More precisely, defining U
M
(j) = GMX
M
(j)
for j = 1, . . . ,K, we may define the random and deterministic sets for each j as
RMǫ,(j)(X(j)|X(j−1), · · · ,X(1), Y ) = {i ∈ [M ] : H
(
U(j),i
∣∣∣U i−1(j) ,XM(j−1), · · · ,XM(1), YM ) ≥ 1− ǫ}, (5)
DMǫ,(j)(X(j)|X(j−1), · · · ,X(1), Y ) = {i ∈ [M ] : H
(
U(j),i
∣∣∣U i−1(j) ,XM(j−1), · · · ,XM(1), YM ) ≤ ǫ}. (6)
In principle we could choose different ǫ parameters for each j, but this will not be necessary here.
Now, Theorem 1 applies to the random and deterministic sets for every j. The sets RMǫ (X|Y ) =
{RM
ǫ,(j)(X(j)|X(j−1), . . . ,X(1), Y )}Kj=1 and DMǫ (X|Y ) = {DMǫ,(j)(X(j)|X(j−1), . . . ,X(1), Y )}Kj=1 have
sizes given by
|RMǫ (X|Y )| =
K∑
j=1
∣∣∣RMǫ,(j)(X(j)|X(j−1), . . . ,X(1), Y )∣∣∣ (7)
=
K∑
j=1
MH
(
X(j)
∣∣X(1), . . . ,X(j−1), Y )− o(M) (8)
=MH(X|Y )− o(KM), (9)
and
|DMǫ (X|Y )| =
K∑
j=1
∣∣∣DMǫ,(j)(X(j)|X(j−1), . . . ,X(1), Y )∣∣∣ (10)
=
K∑
j=1
M
(
1−H(X(j)∣∣X(1), . . . ,X(j−1), Y ))− o(M) (11)
=M (K −H(X|Y ))− o(KM). (12)
In the following we will make use of both the polarization phenomenon in its original form, Theo-
rem 1, and the multilevel extension. To simplify the presentation, we denote by G˜KM the K parallel
applications of GM to the K random variables X
M
(j).
C. One-Way Secret-Key Agreement
At the start of the one-way secret-key agreement protocol, Alice, Bob, and Eve share N = 2n,
n ∈ Z+ i.i.d. copies (XN , Y N , ZN ) of a triple of correlated random variables (X,Y,Z) which take
values in discrete but otherwise arbitrary alphabets X , Y, Z.2
Alice starts the protocol by performing an operation τA : XN → (SJ , C) on XN which outputs
both her secret key SJA ∈ SJ for S = {0, 1} and an additional random variable C ∈ C which she
transmits to Bob over an insecure but noiseless public channel. Bob then performs an operation
τB : (YN , C)→ SJ on Y N and the information C he received from Alice to obtain a vector SJB ∈ SJ ;
his secret key. The secret-key thus produced should be reliable, i.e., satisfy the
reliability condition: lim
N→∞
Pr
[
SJA 6= SJB
]
= 0, (13)
1 An alternative approach is given in [12, 13], where the polarization phenomenon has been generalized for arbitrary
finite fields. We will however focus on the multilevel construction in this paper.
2 The correlation of the random variables (X,Y, Z) is described by its joint probability distribution PX,Y,Z .
4and secure, i.e., satisfy the
(strong) secrecy condition: lim
N→∞
∥∥∥PSJ
A
,ZN ,C − PSJ
A
× PZN ,C
∥∥∥
1
= 0, (14)
where PX denotes the uniform distribution on random variable X.
Historically, secrecy was first characterized by a (weak) secrecy condition of the form
lim
N→∞
1
N
I
(
SJA;Z
N , C
)
= 0. (15)
Maurer and Wolf showed that (15) is not a sufficient secrecy criterion [14, 15] and introduced the
strong secrecy condition
lim
N→∞
I
(
SJA;Z
N , C
)
= 0, (16)
where in addition it is required that the key is uniformly distributed, i.e.,
lim
N→∞
δ
(
PSJ
A
, P SJ
A
)
= 0. (17)
In recent years, the strong secrecy condition (16) has often been replaced by (14), since (half)
the L1 distance directly bounds the probability of distinguishing the actual key produced by the
protocol with an ideal key. This operational interpretation is particularly helpful in the finite
blocklength regime. In the limit N →∞, the two secrecy conditions (14) and (16) are equivalent,
which can be shown using Pinskser’s and Fano’s inequalities.
Since having weak secrecy is not sufficient, we will only consider strong secrecy in this paper.
It has been proven that each secret-key agreement protocol which achieves weak secrecy can be
transformed into a strongly secure protocol [15]. However, it is not clear whether the resulting
protocol is guaranteed to be practically efficient.
For one-way communication, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [4] and later Ahlswede and Csisza´r [16] showed
that the optimal rate R := limN→∞
J
N
of generating a secret key satisfying (13) and (16), called
the secret-key rate S→(X;Y |Z ), is characterized by a closed single-letter formula.
Theorem 2 ([4, 16]). For triples (X,Y,Z) described by PX,Y,Z as explained above,
S→(X;Y |Z ) =


max
PU,V
H(U |Z, V )−H(U |Y, V )
s.t. V −◦−U−◦−X−◦−(Y,Z),
|V| ≤ |X |, |U| ≤ |X |2.
(18)
The expression for the one-way secret-key rate given in Theorem 2 can be simplified if one
makes additional assumptions about PX,Y,Z .
Corollary 3. For PX,Y,Z such that the induced DM-WTC W described by PY,Z|X is more capable,
S→(X;Y |Z ) =


max
PV
H(X|Z, V )−H(X|Y, V )
s.t. V −◦−X−◦−(Y,Z),
|V| ≤ |X |.
(19)
Proof. In terms of the mutual information, we have
H(U |Z, V )−H(U |Y, V ) = I(U ;Y |V )− I(U ;Z|V ) (20)
= I(X,U ;Y |V )− I(X,U ;Z|V )− (I(X;Y |U, V )− I(X;Z|U, V )) (21)
≤ I(X,U ;Y |V )− I(X,U ;Z|V ) (22)
= I(X;Y |V )− I(X;Z|V ) , (23)
using the chain rule, the more capable condition, and the Markov chain properties, respectively.
Thus, the maximum in S→(X;Y |Z) can be achieved when omitting U .
5Corollary 4. For PX,Y,Z such that the induced DM-WTC W described by PY,Z|X is less noisy,
S→(X;Y |Z ) = H(X|Z )−H(X|Y ) . (24)
Proof. Since W being less noisy implies W being more capable, we know that the one-way secret
key rate is given by (19). Using the chain rule we obtain
H(X|Z, V )−H(X|Y, V ) = I(X;Y |V )− I(X;Z|V ) (25)
= I(X,V ;Y )− I(X,V ;Z)− I(V ;Y ) + I(V ;Z) (26)
= I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)− (I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)) (27)
≤ I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) . (28)
Equation (27) follows from the chain rule and the Markov chain condition. The inequality uses the
assumption of being less noisy.
Note that (24) is also equal to the one-way secret-key rate for the case where W is degraded, as
this impliesW being less noisy. The proof of Theorem 2 does not imply that there exists an efficient
one-way secret-key agreement protocol. A computationally efficient scheme was constructed in [17],
but is not known to be practically efficient.3
For key agreement with two-way communication, no formula comparable to (18) for the optimal
rate is known. However, it has been shown that the two-way secret-key rate is strictly larger
than the one-way secret-key rate. It is also known that the intrinsic information I(X;Y ↓Z) :=
minPZ′|Z I(X;Y |Z ′ ) is an upper bound on S(X;Y |Z), but is not tight [16, 18, 19].
D. Private Channel Coding
Private channel coding over a wiretap channel is closely related to the task of one-way secret-
key agreement from common randomness (cf. Section IIE). Here Alice would like to transmit a
message MJ ∈ MJ privately to Bob. The messages can be distributed according to some arbitrary
distribution PMJ . To do so, she first encodes the message by computing X
N = enc(MJ ) for some
encoding function enc : MJ → XN and then sends XN over the wiretap channel to Bob (and to
Eve), which is represented by (Y N , ZN ) = WNXN . Bob next decodes the received message to
obtain a guess for Alice’s message MˆJ = dec(Y N ) for some decoding function dec : YN → MJ .
As in secret-key agreement, the private channel coding scheme should be reliable, i.e., satisfy the
reliability condition: lim
J→∞
Pr
[
MJ 6= MˆJ
]
= 0 (29)
and (strongly) secure, i.e., satisfy the
(strong) secrecy condition: lim
J→∞
∥∥PMJ ,ZN ,C − PMJ × PZN ,C∥∥1 = 0. (30)
The variable C denotes any additional information made public by the protocol.
As mentioned in Section IIC, in the limit J →∞ this strong secrecy condition is equivalent to
the historically older (strong) secrecy condition
lim
J→∞
I
(
MJ ;ZN , C
)
= 0. (31)
The highest achievable rate R := limN→∞
J
N
fulfilling (29) and (30) is called the secrecy capacity.
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner showed [4, Corollary 2] that there exists a single-letter formula for the
secrecy capacity.4
3 As defined in Section I, we call a scheme practically efficient if its computational complexity is essentially linear
in the blocklength.
4 Maurer and Wolf showed that the single-letter formula remains valid considering strong secrecy [15].
6Theorem 5 ([4]). For an arbitrary DM WTC W as introduced above,
Cs =


max
PV,X
H(V |Z )−H(V |Y )
s.t. V −◦−X−◦−(Y,Z),
|V| ≤ |X |.
(32)
This expression can be simplified using additional assumptions about W.
Corollary 6 ([7]). If W is more capable,
Cs = H(X|Z )−H(X|Y ) . (33)
Proof. A proof can be found in [7] or [20, Section 22.1].
E. Previous Work and Our Contributions
In Section III, we present a one-way secret-key agreement scheme based on polar codes that
achieves the secret-key rate, is strongly secure, reliable and whose implementation is practically
efficient, with complexity O(N logN) for blocklength N . Our protocol improves previous efficient
secret-key constructions [21], where only weak secrecy could be proven and where the eavesdropper
has no prior knowledge and/or degradability assumptions are required. However, we are not able
to give an efficient algorithm for code construction.
In Section IV, we introduce a coding scheme based on polar codes that provably achieves the
secrecy capacity for arbitrary discrete memoryless wiretap channels. We show that the complexity
of the encoding and decoding operations is O(N logN) for blocklength N . Our scheme improves
previous work on practically efficient private channel coding at the optimal rate [22], where only
weak secrecy could be proven under the additional assumption that the channel W is degraded.5
Recently, Bellare et al. introduced an efficient coding scheme that is strongly secure and achieves
the secrecy capacity for binary symmetric wiretap channels [23].6 Several other constructions of
private channel coding schemes have been reported [24–26], but all achieve only weak secrecy.
The tasks of one-way secret-key agreement and private channel coding explained in the previous
two subsections are closely related. Maurer showed how a one-way secret-key agreement can be
derived from a private channel coding scenario [2]. More precisely, he showed how to obtain the
common randomness needed for one-way secret-key agreement by constructing a “virtual” degraded
wiretap channel from Alice to Bob. This approach can be used to obtain the one-way secret-key
rate from the secrecy capacity result in the wiretap channel scenario [20, Section 22.4.3].
One of the main advantages of the two schemes introduced in this paper is that they are both
practically efficient. However, even given a practically efficient private coding scheme, it is not
known that Maurer’s construction will yield a practically efficient scheme for secret key agreement.
For this reason, as well as simplicity of presentation, we treat the one-way secret-key agreement
and the private channel coding problem separately in the two sections to follow.
III. ONE-WAY SECRET-KEY AGREEMENT SCHEME
Our key agreement protocol is a concatenation of two subprotocols, an inner and an outer
layer, as depicted in Figure 1. The protocol operates on blocks of N i.i.d. triples (X,Y,Z), which
5 Note that Mahdavifar and Vardy showed that their scheme achieves strong secrecy if the channel to Eve (induced
from W) is noiseless. Otherwise their scheme is not provably reliable [22].
6 They claim that their scheme works for a large class of wiretap channels. However, this class has not been
characterized precisely so far. It is therefore not clear wether their scheme requires for example degradability
assumptions. Note that to obtain strong secrecy for an arbitrarily distributed message, it is required that the
wiretap channel is symmetric [23, Lemma14].
7are divided into M sub-blocks of size L for input to the inner layer. In the following we assume
X = {0, 1}, which however is only for convenience; the techniques of [9] and [27] can be used to
generalize the schemes to discrete memoryless wiretap channels with arbitrary input size.
The task of the inner layer is to perform information reconciliation and that of the outer layer
is to perform privacy amplification. Information reconciliation refers to the process of carrying out
error correction to ensure that Alice and Bob obtain a shared bit string, and here we only allow
communication from Alice to Bob for this purpose. On the other hand, privacy amplification refers
to the process of distilling from Alice’s and Bob’s shared bit string a smaller set of bits whose
correlation with the information available to Eve is below a desired threshold.
Each subprotocol in our scheme is based on the polarization phenomenon. For information
reconciliation of Alice’s random variable XL relative to Bob’s information Y L, Alice applies a polar
transformation to XL and forwards the bits of the complement of the deterministic set DLǫ1(X|Y )
to Bob over a insecure public channel, which enables him to recover XL using the standard polar
decoder [5]. Her remaining information is then fed into a multilevel polar transformation and the
bits of the random set are kept as the secret key.
Let us now define the protocol more precisely. For L = 2ℓ, ℓ ∈ Z+, let V L = GLXL where GL
is as defined in (1). For ǫ1 > 0, we define
EK := DLǫ1(X|Y ), (34)
with K := |DLǫ1(X|Y )|. Then, let T(j) = V L[EK ]j for j = 1, . . . ,K and C(j) = V L[EcK ]j for
j = 1, . . . , L − K so that T = (T(1), . . . , T(K)) and C = (C(1), . . . , C(L−K)). For ǫ2 > 0 and
UM(j) = GMT
M
(j) for j = 1, . . . K (or, more briefly, U
M = G˜KMT
M), we define
FJ := RMǫ2 (T |CZL), (35)
with J := |RMǫ2 (T |CZL)|.
Protocol 1: One-way secret-key agreement
Given: Index sets EK and FJ (code construction)
Notation: Alice’s input: xN ∈ ZN2 (a realization of XN )
Bob’s / Eve’s input: (yN , zN) (realizations of Y N and ZN)
Alice’s output: sJA
Bob’s output: sJB
Step 1: Alice computes vi+Li+1 = GLx
i+L
i+1 for all i ∈ {0, L, 2L, . . . , (M − 1)L}.
Step 2: Alice computes ti = v
i+L
i+1 [EK ] for all i ∈ {0, L, 2L, . . . , (M − 1)L}.
Step 3: Alice sends ci = v
i+L
i+1 [EcK ] for all i ∈ {0, L, 2L, . . . , (M − 1)L} over a public channel to Bob.
Step 4: Alice computes uM = G˜KM t
M and obtains sJA = u
M [FJ ].6
Step 5: Bob applies the standard polar decoder [5, 11] to (ci, y
i+L
i+1 ) to obtain vˆ
i+L
i+1 and
tˆi = vˆ
i+L
i+1 [EK ], for i ∈ {0, L, 2L, . . . , (M − 1)L}.
Step 6: Bob computes uˆM = G˜KM t
M and obtains sJB = uˆ
M [FJ ].
6 The expression uM [FJ ] is an abuse of notation, as FJ is not a subset of [M]. The expression should be understood
to be the union of the random bits of uM(j), for all j = 1, . . . ,K, as in the definition of R
M
ǫ2
(T |CZL).
8PA
G˜KM
IR
GL
IR
GL
dec
dec
G˜KM
UˆKM [FJ ] ≡ SJB
UˆKM [F cJ ]
SJA ≡ UKM [FJ ]
UKM [F cJ ]
V L[EcK ]
V L[EK ]
VMLL+1 [EK ]
VMLL+1 [EcK ]
VˆMLL+1 [EK ]
Vˆ L[EK ]
Source
XN (Y N , ZN)
τA τB
C1
C2
FIG. 1. The secret-key agreement scheme for the setup N = 8, L = 4, M = 2, K = 2, and J = 2. We
consider a source that produces N i.i.d. copies (XN , Y N , ZN ) of a triple of correlated random variables
(X,Y, Z). Alice performs the operation τA, sends (V
L[EcK ])M over a public channel to Bob and obtains SJA,
her secret key. Bob then performs the operation τB which results in his secret key S
J
B.
A. Rate, Reliability, Secrecy, and Efficiency
Theorem 7. Protocol 1 allows Alice and Bob to generate a secret key SJA respecitvely S
J
B using
public one-way communication CMsuch that for β < 12 :
Reliability: Pr
[
SJA 6= SJB
]
= O
(
M2−L
β
)
(36)
Secrecy:
∥∥∥PSJ
A
,ZN ,C − PSJ
A
× PZN ,C
∥∥∥
1
= O
(√
N2−
Nβ
2
)
(37)
Rate: R :=
J
N
= H(X|Z )− 1
L
H
(
V L[EcK ]
∣∣ZL )− o(N)
N
. (38)
All operations by both parties may be performed in O(N logN) steps.
Proof. The reliability of Alice’s and Bob’s key follows from the standard polar decoder error prob-
ability and the union bound. Each instance of the decoding algorithm employed by Bob has an
error probability which scales as O(2−L
β
) for β < 12 [8]; application of the union bound gives the
prefactor M .
To prove the secrecy statement requires more effort. Using Pinsker’s inequality we obtain
δ
(
PSJ
A
,ZN ,CM , PSJ
A
× PZN ,CM
)
≤
√
ln 2
2 D
(
PSJ
A
,ZN ,CM
∣∣∣∣∣∣PSJ
A
× PZN ,CM
)
(39)
=
√
ln 2
2
(
J −H(SJA|ZN , CM )), (40)
where the last step uses the chain rule for relative entropies and that PSJ
A
denotes the uniform
9distribution. We can simplify the conditional entropy expression using the chain rule
H
(
SJA
∣∣ZN , CM )
= H
(
UM [FJ ]
∣∣ZN , (V L[EcK ])M ) (41)
=
K∑
j=1
H
(
UM(j)[F(j)]
∣∣∣UM(1)[F(1)], . . . , UM(j−1)[F(j−1)], ZN , (V L[EcK ])M ) (42)
=
K∑
j=1
|F(i)|∑
i=1
H
(
UM(j)[F(j)]i
∣∣∣UM(j)[F(j)]i−1, UM(1)[F(1)], . . . , UM(j−1)[F(j−1)], ZN , (V L[EcK ])M ) (43)
≥
K∑
j=1
∑
i∈Fj
H
(
U(j)i
∣∣∣U i−1(j) , UM(1)[F(1)], . . . , UM(j−1)[F(j−1)], ZN , (V L[EcK ])M ) (44)
≥ J (1− ǫ2) , (45)
where the first inequality uses the fact that that conditioning reduces entropy and the sec-
ond inequality follows by the definition of FJ . Recall that we are using the notation in-
troduced in Section IIB. For FJ as defined in (35), we have FJ =
{F(j)}Kj=1 where F(j) =
RMǫ2
(
T(j)
∣∣T(j−1), . . . , T(1), C, ZL ). The polarization phenomenon, Theorem 1, implies J = O(N),
which together with (40) proves the secrecy statement of Theorem 7, since ǫ2 = O(2
−Nβ ) for
β < 12 .
The rate of the scheme is
R =
|FJ |
N
(46)
=
1
L
H
(
V L[EK ]
∣∣V L[EcK ], ZL )− o(N)N (47)
=
1
L
(
H
(
V L
∣∣ZL )−H(V L[EcK ]∣∣ZL ))− o(N)N (48)
= H(X|Z )− 1
L
H
(
V L[EcK ]
∣∣ZL )− o(N)
N
, (49)
where (47) uses the polarization phenomenon stated in Theorem 1.
It remains to show that the computational complexity of the scheme is O(N logN). Alice
performs the operation GL in the first layer M times, each requiring O(L logL) steps [5]. In
the second layer she performs G˜KM , or K parallel instances of GM , requiring O(KM logM) total
steps. From the polarization phenomenon, we have K = O(L), and thus the complexity of Alice’s
operations is not worse than O(N logN). Bob runs M standard polar decoders which can be done
in O(ML logL) complexity [5, 11]. Bob next performs the polar transform G˜KM , whose complexity
is not worse than O(N logN) as justified above. Thus, the complexity of Bob’s operations is also
not worse than O(N logN).
In principle, the two parameters L and M can be chosen freely. However, to maintain the
reliability of the scheme (cf.(36)), M may not grow exponentially fast in L. A reasonable choice
would be to have both parameters scale comparably fast, i.e., M
L
= O(1).
Corollary 8. The rate of Protocol 1 given in Theorem 7 can be bounded as
R ≥ max
{
0,H(X|Z )−H(X|Y )− o(N)
N
}
. (50)
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Proof. According to (49) the rate of Protocol 1 is
R = H(X|Z )− 1
L
H
(
V L[EcK ]
∣∣ZL )− o(N)
N
(51)
≥ max
{
0,H(X|Z )− |E
c
K |
L
− o(N)
N
}
(52)
= max
{
0,H(X|Z )−H(X|Y )− o(N)
N
}
, (53)
where (53) uses the polarization phenomenon stated in Theorem 1.
B. Achieving the Secret-Key Rate
Theorem 7 together with Corollaries 4 and 8 immediately imply that Protocol 1 achieves the
secret-key rate S→(X;Y |Z ) if PX,Y,Z is such that the induced DM WTP W is less noisy. If we can
solve the optimization problem (18), i.e., find the optimal auxiliary random variables V and U , our
one-way secret-key agreement scheme can achieve S→(X;Y |Z ) for a general setup. We then make
V public, replace X by U and run Protocol 1. Note that finding the optimal random variables
V and U might be difficult. It has been shown that for certain distributions the optimal random
variables V and U can be found analytically [17].
Two open problems discussed in Section V address the question if Protocol 1 can achieve a rate
that is strictly larger than max {0,H(X|Z )−H(X|Y )} if nothing about the optimal auxiliary
random variables V and U is known, i.e., if we run the protocol directly for X without making V
public.
C. Code Construction
Before the protocol starts one must construct the code, i.e. compute the index sets EK and
FJ . The set EK can be computed approximately with a linear-time algorithm introduced in [28],
given the distributions PX and PY |X . Alternatively, Tal and Vardy’s older algorithm [29] and its
adaption to the asymmetric setup [11] can be used.
To compute the outer index set FJ even approximately requires more effort. In principle, we can
again use the above algorithms, which require a description of the “super-source” seen by the outer
layer, i.e. the source which outputs the triple of random variables (V L[EK ], (Y L, V L[EcK ]), (ZL, V L[EcK ])).
However, its alphabet size is exponential in L, and thus such a direct approach will not be efficient
in the overall blocklength N . Nonetheless, due to the structure of the inner layer, it is perhaps
possible that the method of approximation by limiting the alphabet size [28, 29] can be extended to
this case. In particular, a recursive construction motivated by the decoding operation introduced
in [6] could potentially lead to an efficient computation of the index set FJ .
IV. PRIVATE CHANNEL CODING SCHEME
Our private channel coding scheme is a simple modification of the secret key agreement protocol
of the previous section. Again it consists of two layers, an inner layer which ensures transmitted
messages can be reliably decoded by the intended receiver, and an outer layer which guarantees
privacy from the unintended receiver. The basic idea is to simply run the key agreement scheme in
reverse, inputting messages to the protocol where secret key bits would be output in key agreement.
The immediate problem in doing so is that key agreement also produces outputs besides the secret
11
key, so the procedure is not immediately reversible. To overcome this problem, the encoding
operations here simulate the random variables output in the key agreement protocol, and then
perform the polar transformations G˜KM and GL in reverse.
7
The scheme is visualized in Figure 2 and described in detail in Protocol 2. Not explicitly shown
is the simulation of the bits UM [FJ ] at the outer layer and the bits V L[EcK ] at the inner layer. The
outer layer, whose simulated bits are nearly deterministic, makes use of the method described in
[30, Definition 1], while the inner layer, whose bits are nearly uniformly-distributed, follows [11,
Section IV]. Both proceed by successively sampling from the individual bit distributions given all
previous values in the particular block, i.e., constructing Vj by sampling from PVj |V j−1 . These
distributions can be efficiently constructed, as described in Section IVC.
Note that a public channel is used to communicate the information reconciliation information
to Bob, enabling reliable decoding. However, it is possible to dispense with the public channel and
still achieve the same rate and efficiency properties, as will be discussed in Section IVC.
In the following we assume that the message MJ to be transmitted is uniformly distributed
over the message set M = {0, 1}J . As mentioned in Section IID, it may be desirable to have
a private coding scheme that works for an arbitrarily distributed message. This can be achieved
by assuming that the wiretap channel W is symmetric—more precisely, by assuming that the two
channels W1 : X → Y and W2 : X → Z induced by W are symmetric. We can define a super-
channel W′ : T → YL×ZL×C which consists of an inner encoding block and L basic channels W.8
The super-channel W′ again induces two channels W′1 : T → YL×C and W′2 : T → ZL×C. Arıkan
showed that W1 respectively W2 being symmetric implies that W
′
1 respectively W
′
2 is symmetric [5,
Proposition 13]. It has been shown in [22, Proposition 3] that for symmetric channels polar codes
remain reliable for an arbitrary distribution of the message bits. We thus conclude that if W1 is
assumed to be symmetric, our coding scheme remains reliable for arbitrarily distributed messages.
Assuming having a symmetric channel W2 implies that W
′
2 is symmetric which proves that our
scheme is strongly secure for arbitrarily distributed messages.9
Protocol 2: Private channel coding
Given: Index sets EK and FJ (code construction)10
Notation: Message to be transmitted: mJ
Outer encoding: Let uM [FJ ] = mJ11 and uM [F cJ ] = rKM−J where rKM−J is (randomly) generated
as explained in [30, Definition 1]. Let tM = G˜KMu
M .
Inner encoding: For all i ∈ {0, L, . . . , L(M − 1)}, Alice does the following: let v¯i+Li+1 [EK ] = t(i/L)+1
and v¯i+Li+1 [EcK ] = si+L−Ki+1 where si+L−Ki+1 is (randomly) generated as explained in
[11, Section IV]. Send C(i/K)+1 := s
i+L−K
i+1 over a public channel to Bob. Finally,
compute xi+Li+1 = GLv¯
i+L
i+1 .
Transmission: (yN , zN) = WNxN
Inner decoding: Bob uses the standard decoder [5, 11] with inputs C(i/L)+1 and y
i+L
i+1 to obtain vˆ
i+L
i+1 ,
and hence tˆ(i/L)+1 = vˆ
i+L
i+1 [EK ], for each i ∈ {0, L, . . . , L(M − 1)}.
Outer decoding: Bob computes uˆM = G˜KM tˆ
M and outputs a guess for the sent message mˆJ = uˆM [FJ ].
7 As it happens, GL is its own inverse.
8 This super-channel is explained in more detail in Section VB.
9 This can be seen easily by the strong secrecy condition given in (30) using that W′2 is symmetric.
10 By the code construction the channel input distribution PX is defined. PX should be chosen such that it maximizes
the scheme’s rate.
11 Again an abuse of notation. See the Footnote 6 of Protocol 1.
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FIG. 2. The private channel coding scheme for the setup N = 8, L = 4, M = 2, K = 2, and J = 2.
The message MJ is first sent through an outer encoder which adds some bits (simulated as explained in
[11, Section IV]) and applies the polarization transform G˜KM . The output T
M = (T(1), . . . , T(K))
M is then
encoded a second time by M independent identical blocks. Note that each block again adds redundancy
(as explained in [30, Definition 1]) before applying the polarization transform GL. Each inner encoding
block sends the frozen bits over a public channel to Bob. Note that this extra public communcation can be
avoided as justified in Section IVC. The output XN is then sent over N copies of the wiretap channel W to
Bob. Bob then applies a decoding operation as in the key agreement scheme, Section III.
A. Rate, Reliability, Secrecy, and Efficiency
Corollary 9. For any β < 12 , Protocol 2 satisfies
Reliability: Pr
[
MJ 6= MˆJ
]
= O
(
M2−L
β
)
(54)
Secrecy:
∥∥PMJ ,ZN ,C − PMJ × PZN ,C∥∥1 = O
(√
N2−
Nβ
2
)
(55)
Rate: R = H(X|Z )− 1
L
H
(
V L[EcK ]
∣∣ZL )− o(N)
N
(56)
and its computational complexity is O(N logN).
Proof. Recall that the idea of the private channel coding scheme is to run Protocol 1 backwards.
Since Protocol 2 simulates the nearly deterministic bits UM [FJ ] at the outer encoder as described
in [30, Definition 1] and the almost random bits V L[EcK ] at the inner encoder as explained in
[11, Section IV], it follows that for large values of L and M the private channel coding scheme
approximates the one-way secret-key scheme setup,12 i.e., limN→∞ δ
(
PTM , P(V L[EK ])M
)
= 0 and
limL→∞ δ
(
PXL , PXˆL
)
= 0 and, where PXL denotes the distribution of the vector X
L which is sent
over the wiretap channel W and P
XˆL
denotes the distribution of Alice’s random variable XˆL in
the one-way secret-key agreement setup. We thus can use the decoder introduced in [8] to decode
the inner layer. Since we are using M identical independent inner decoding blocks, by the union
12 This approximation can be made arbitrarily precise for sufficiently large values of L and M .
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bound we obtain the desired reliability condition. The secrecy and rate statement are immediate
consequences from Theorem 7.
As mentioned after Theorem 7, to ensure reliability of the protocol, M may not grow exponen-
tially fast in L.
Corollary 10. The rate of Protocol 2 given in Corollary 9 can be bounded as
R ≥ max
{
0,H(X|Z )−H(X|Y )− o(N)
N
}
. (57)
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Corollary 8.
B. Achieving the Secrecy Capacity
Corollaries 6 and 10 immediately imply that our private channel coding scheme achieves the
secrecy capacity for the setup where W is more capable. If we can find the optimal auxiliary
random variable V in (32), Protocol 2 can achieve the secrecy capacity for a general wiretap
channel scenario. We define a super-channel W : V → Y × Z which includes the random variable
X and the wiretap channel W. The super-channel W is characterized by its transition probability
distribution PY,Z|V where V is the optimal random variable solving (32). The private channel
coding scheme is then applied to the super-channel, achieving the secrecy capacity. Note that
finding the optimal random variable V might be difficult.
In Section V, we discuss the question if it is possible that Protocol 2 achieves a rate that is
strictly larger than max {0,H(X|Z )−H(X|Y )}, if nothing about the optimal auxiliary random
variable V is known.
C. Code Construction & Public Channel Communication
To start the private channel coding scheme the code construction has to be done. Therefore,
the index sets EK and FJ as defined in (34) and (35) need to be computed. This can be done as
explained in Section IIIC. The code construction defines the input distribution PX to the wiretap
channel, which should be chosen such that it maximizes the scheme’s rate given in (56).
We next explain how the communication CM ∈ CM from Alice to Bob can be reduced such
that it does not affect the rate, i.e., we show that we can choose |C| = o(L). Recall that we
defined the index set EK := DLǫ1(X|Y ) in (34). Let G := RLǫ1(X|Y ) using the noation introduced
in (2) and I := [L]\(EK ∪ G) = EcK\G. As explained in Section II B, G consists of the outputs Vj
which are essentially uniformly random, even given all previous outputs V j−1 as well as Y L, where
V L = GLX
L. The index set I consists of the outputs Vj which are neither essentially uniformly
random nor essentially deterministic given V j−1 and Y L. The polarization phenomenon stated
in Theorem 1 ensures that this set is small, i.e., that |I| = o(L). Since the bits of G are almost
uniformly distributed, we can fix these bits independently of the message—as part of the code
construction—without affecting the reliability of the scheme for large blocklengths.13 We thus
only need to communicate the bits belonging to the index set I.
We can send the bits belonging to I over a seperate public noiseless channel. Alternatively, we
could send them over the wiretap channel W that we are using for private channel coding. However
13 Recall that we choose ǫ1 = O
(
2−L
β
)
for β < 1
2
, such that for L → ∞ the index set G contains only uniformly
distributed bits.
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since W is assumed to be noisy and it is essential that the bits in I are recieved by Bob without
any errors, we need to protect them using an error correcting code. To not destroy the essentially
linear computational complexity of our scheme, the code needs to have an encoder and decoder
that are practically efficient. Since |I| = o(L), we can use any error correcting code that has a
non-vanishing rate. For symmetric binary DMCs, polar coding can be used to transmit reliably
an arbitrarily distributed message [22, Proposition 3]. We can therefore symmetrize our wiretap
channel W and use polar codes to transmit the bits in I.14
As the reliability of the scheme is the average over the possible assignments of the random bits
belonging to I (or even EcK), at least one choice must be as good as the average, meaning a reliable,
efficient, and deterministic scheme must exist. However, it might be computationally hard to find
this choice.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we describe two open problems, both of which address the question of whether
rates beyond max {0,H(X|Z )−H(X|Y )} can be achieved by our key agreement scheme, even
if the optimal auxiliary random variables V and U are not given, i.e., if we run Protocol 1 di-
rectly for X (instead of U) without making V public. It may be even possible that the key
agreement scheme achieves the optimal rate; no result to our knowledge implies otherwise. The
two questions could also be formulated in the private coding scenario, whether rates beyond
max {0,maxPX H(X|Z )−H(X|Y )} are possible, but as positive answers in the former context
imply positive answers in the latter, we shall restrict attention to the key agreement scenario for
simplicity.
A. Polarization with Bob’s or Eve’s Side Information
Question 1. Does for some distributions PX,Y,Z the rate of Protocol 1 satisfy
R > max {0,H(X|Z )−H(X|Y )} , for N →∞? (58)
An equivalent formulation of this question is whether inequality (52) is always tight for large
enough N , i.e.,
Question 1’. Is it possible that
lim
L→∞
1
L
H
(
V L[EcK ]
∣∣ZL ) < lim
L→∞
1
L
|EcK | , for R > 0? (59)
Using the polarization phenomenon stated in Theorem 1 we obtain
lim
L→∞
1
L
|EcK | = H(X|Y ) , (60)
which together with (59) would imply that R > max {0,H(X|Z )−H(X|Y )} for N → ∞ is
possible. Relation (59) can only be satisfied if the high-entropy set with respect to Bob’s side
information, i.e., the set EcK , is not always a high-entropy set with respect to Eve’s side information.
Thus, the question of rates in the key agreement protocol is closely related to fundamental structural
properties of the polarization phenomenon.
14 Note that the symmetrization of the channel will reduce its rate which however does not matter as we need a
non-vanishing rate only.
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For less noisy channels W defined by PY Z|X (cf. Section IIA), these questions can be answered
in the negative. In this case we have H(XL|ZL) ≥ H(XL|Y L), and since V L[EcK ] is a deterministic
function of XL,
lim
L→∞
1
L
H
(
V L[EcK ]
∣∣ZL ) ≥ lim
L→∞
1
L
H
(
V L[EcK ]
∣∣Y L ) = lim
L→∞
1
L
|EcK | . (61)
Thus, (59) cannot hold. The final equality can be justified as follows. Recall that we defined EK :=
DLǫ1(X|Y ) in (34). Let HL−K := RLǫ1(X|Y ) and I := [L]\(EK ∪HL−K) such that EcK = HL−K ∪ I.
Recall that we can choose ǫ1 = O(2
−Lβ1 ) for β1 <
1
2 . Using the chain rule and the polarization
phenomenon given in Theorem 1, we obtain
lim
L→∞
1
L
H
(
V L[EcK ]
∣∣Y L ) = lim
L→∞
1
L
∑
i∈EK
H
(
V L[EcK ]i
∣∣V L[EcK ]i−1, Y L ) (62)
≥ lim
L→∞
1
L
((1− ǫ1) |HL−K |+ ǫ1 |I|) (63)
= lim
L→∞
1
L
|EcK | . (64)
Using the upper bound of the entropy in terms of the alphabet size we conclude that the
equality in (61) holds. The fact that (59) is not possible in the setup where W is less noisy
accords with the one-way secret-key rate formula given in (24), which excludes rates beyond
max {0,H(X|Z )−H(X|Y )}.
If the answer to Question 1, or equivalently to Question 1’, is “yes”, this would give some new
insights into the problem of finding the optimal auxiliary random variables U, V in (18) (and V in
(32)), which may be hard in general.
Furthermore, a positive answer to Question 1 implies that we can send quantum information
reliable over a quantum channel at a rate that is beyond the coherent information using the scheme
introduced in [6]. Since the best known achievable rate for a wide class of quantum channels is the
coherent information, our scheme would improve this bound. Furthermore, it would be of interest
to know by how much we can outperform the coherent information.15
B. Approximately Less Noisy Super-Channel
To state the second open problem, consider the super-source which outputs the triple of ran-
dom variables (V L[EK ], (Y L, V L[EcK ]), (ZL, V L[EcK ])). For instance, Figure 1 consists of two super-
sources. The super-source implicitly defines a super-channel W′ using the conditional probability
distribution of the second two random variables given the first. Then we have
Proposition 11. For sufficiently large L, the channel W′ is approximately less noisy, irrespective
of W.
Proof. Using the chain rule we can write
H
(
V L[EK ]
∣∣V L[EcK ], Y L ) = ∑
i∈EK
H
(
V L[EK ]i
∣∣V L[EK ]i−1, V L[EcK ], Y L ) (65)
≤
∑
i∈EK
H
(
Vi
∣∣V i−1, Y L ) (66)
≤ Kǫ1, (67)
15 Since there exist a lot of good converse bounds for sending quantum information reliable over an arbitrary quantum
channel [31–33], it would be interesting to see how closely they can be met.
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where the last inquality follows by definition of the set EK . Recall that we can choose ǫ1 = O
(
2−L
β
)
for β < 12 . The polarization phenomenon stated in Theorem 1 ensures that K = O (L). Hence, we
can apply the following Lemma 12 which proves the assertion.
Lemma 12. If U−◦−X−◦−(Y,Z) form a Markov chain in the given order and H(X|Y ) ≤ ǫ for
ǫ ≥ 0, then H(U |Y ) ≤ H(U |Z ) + ǫ for all possible distributions of (U,X).
Proof. Using the chain rule and the non-negativity of the entropy we can write
H(U |Y ) ≤ H(U |Y ) +H(X|Y,U ) (68)
= H(U,X |Y ) (69)
= H(X|Y ) +H(U |X,Y ) (70)
≤ ǫ+H(U |X ) (71)
≤ ǫ+H(U |Z ) . (72)
Inequality (71) follows by assumption and since conditioning reduces entropy. The final inequality
uses the data processing inequality.
Proposition 11 and Lemma 12 imply that the DM-WTC W′ induced by the super-source de-
scribed above is almost less noisy. More precisely we have for β < 12 and ξ = O
(
L2−L
β
)
H
(
T
∣∣V L[EcK ], Y L ) ≤ H(T ∣∣V L[EcK ], ZL )+ ξ, (73)
for all possible distributions of T , where T−◦−V L[EK]−◦−((Y L, V L[EcK ]), (ZL, V L[EcK ])) and |T | ≤
K. Following the proof of Corollary 4—using (73) in (28)—we obtain the one-way secret-key rate
of the super-source as
1
L
S→
(
V L[EK ];Y L, V L[EcK ]
∣∣ZL, V L[EcK ])
=
1
L
(
H
(
V L[EK ]
∣∣ZL, V L[EcK ])−H(V L[EK ]∣∣Y L, V L[EcK ])+ ξ) (74)
=
1
L
(
H
(
V L[EK ]
∣∣ZL, V L[EcK ]))− o(N)N (75)
= R. (76)
The second equation follows by definition of the set EK and (76) is according to (47). We thus
conclude that the one-way secret-key agreement scheme introduced in Section III always achieves
the one-way secret-key rate for the super-source as defined above. This raises the question of when
the super-source has the same key rate as the original source, i.e., how much is is lost in the first
layer of our key agreement scheme.
Question 2. For what conditions does 1
L
S→
(
V L[EK ];Y L, V L[EcK ]
∣∣ZL, V L[EcK ]) = S→(X;Y |Z )
hold?
Having 1
L
S→
(
V L[EK ];Y L, V L[EcK ]
∣∣ZL, V L[EcK ]) = S→(X;Y |Z ) implies that Protocol 1 achieves
the one-way secret-key rate without knowing anything about the optimal auxiliary random variables
V and U . If W is less noisy, Corollary 4 ensures that 1
L
S→
(
V L[EK ];Y L, V L[EcK ]
∣∣ZL, V L[EcK ]) =
S→(X;Y |Z ) must be satisfied. For other scenarios Question 2 is currently unsolved.
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For the setup of private channel coding, following the proof of Corollary 6 using (73) shows that
the secrecy capacity of the super-channel W′ is
Cs(W
′) =
1
L
(
H
(
V L[EK ]
∣∣ZL, V L[EcK ])−H(V L[EK ]∣∣Y L, V L[EcK ])+ ξ) (77)
=
1
L
(
H
(
V L[EK ]
∣∣ZL, V L[EcK ]))− o(N)N (78)
= R. (79)
The scheme introduced in Protocol 2 hence achieves the secrecy capacity for the channel W′ ir-
respective of the channel W. This raises the question when the super-channel and the original
channel have the same secrecy capacity.
Question 2’. Under what conditions does Cs(W
′) = Cs(W) hold?
Cs(W
′) = Cs(W) being valid implies that Protocol 2 achieves the secrecy capacity of W without
having knowledge about the optimal auxiliary random variable V . If W is more capable, according
to Corollary 6 Cs(W
′) = Cs(W) must hold. For other channels, Question 2’ has not yet been
resolved.
C. Conclusion
We have constructed practically efficient protocols (with complexity essentially linear in the
blocklength) for one-way secret-key agreement from correlated randomness and for private channel
coding over discrete memoryless wiretap channels. Each protocol achieves the corresponding op-
timal rate. Compared to previous methods, we do not require any degradability assumptions and
achieve strong (rather than weak) secrecy.
Our scheme is formulated for arbitrary discrete memoryless wiretap channels. Using ideas of
S¸as¸og˘lu et al. [9] the two protocols presented in this paper can also be used for wiretap channels
with continuous input alphabets.
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